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The Scattered Remains of Sovereign
Immunity for Foreign States After
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc.-Due Process Protection or
Nothing
ABSTRACT
The globalization of the United States economy in the
latter half of the twentieth century has fostered greater
interaction between the United States andforeign states and
their instrumentalities. As a result, the likelihood of legal
disputes arising between United States entities and foreign
states has increased. Traditionally,foreign states have been
Immune from suit in United States courts. However, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), enacted in 1976,
specifies instances In which United States courts may deny
immunity toforeign states and exerciseJurisdictionover them.
Under one provision of the FSIA, aforeign state mayfoifeit its
immunity !f it engages In a commercial activity outside of the
United States that has a direct effect within the United States.
The United States Supreme Court recently Interpreted the
direct effect clause of this commercial activity exception in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. The Court broadly
defined the terms "commercial activity" and "direct effect,"
thereby making foreign states and their state-owned
enterprises more vulnerable to suit in the United States.
Arguably, then, the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution may provide foreign states the only protection
against the jurisdiction of United States courts; however, the
Weltover Court refused to determine whether such protection
extends to foreign states and their instrumentalities. This
Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Weltover. It
addresses the issues unresolved by the Court and surveys
the problems encountered by lower courts applying
Weltover's holdings. The author concludes that practical
concerns and principles of internationallav weigh in favor of

extending constitutional due process protection to foreign

states.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the early nineteenth century, United States jurisprudence has recognized that foreign states may be immune from
the jurisdiction of United States courts.1
In 1976, Congress
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 2 (FSIA or the Act),
which provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign states and their instrumentalities in United States
courts. 3 The Act presumes the immunity of foreign states from

1.
See Infra note 18 (tracing the origin of the United States doctrine of
sovereign immunity to The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116(1812)).
2.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a(2)(3)(4), 1391(), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988).
3.
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
443 (1989).
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the jurisdiction of United

States

courts4

and then
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lists

circumstances in which sovereign immunity should be denied.5
Under the Act, a United States court may deny immunity
when a foreign state engages in a commercial activity that has
This commercial activity
some nexus to the United States.
exception is codified at Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. 6 The
exception provides that a United States court may adjudicate a

claim against a foreign sovereign if the foreign state (1) engages in
a commercial activity in the United States, (2) acts in the United

States in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere, or (3)
the United States that
engages in a commercial activity outside
7
has a direct effect in the United States.

According to Congress, the commercial activity exception is
the most important exception to foreign sovereign immunity.8 In

"Subject to existing international agreements... a foreign state shall
4.
28
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States...."

U.S.C. §1604 (1988).
5.
Section 1605 lists the five primary exceptions to jurisdictional
immunity:
(1) express or implied waiver;
(2) actions based upon a commercial activity having some nexus to
the United States;
(3) actions involving property taken in violation of international law;
(4) actions involving property in the United States acquired by
succession or gift;
(5) actions comprising a non-commercial tort occurring in the
United States.
28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(1-5) (1988).
Section 1605 (a)(2) defines the commercial activity exception as
6.
follows:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case(2) (1) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by a foreign state; or
(ii) upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
(ifi) upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) (paragraph structure not present in the original).
7.
Id.
In the legislative history of the FSIA, Congress stated that Section
8.
1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. which involves commercial activities of a foreign state that
have a nexus to the United States, "is probably the most important instance in
which foreign states are denied immunity." H.R. RFP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong.,
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the second half of the twentieth century, United States citizens
and corporations increasingly have come into contact with both
foreign states and entities owned by foreign states. 9 Today, stateowned trading enterprises account for over fifteen percent of
international trade.1 0 Because of the large number of commercial
transactions involving foreign states, and because the FSIA
exceptions provide the only means of obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign states, the commercial activity exception of the Act has
become very important in the resolution of disputes arising out of
international business transactions.
This Note focuses on the third prong of the commercial
activity exception, the direct effect clause. This clause provides
that a foreign state is not immune from suit in a case based on
the foreign state's commercial activity outside the United States if

that activity causes a direct effect in the United States.11 The
United States Supreme Court recently interpreted
the direct effect
12
clause In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.

In Weltover, the Supreme Court broadly defined the terms
"commercial activity"13 and "direct effect." 14 In light of the
Court's expansive definition of the direct effect clause of the
commercial activity exception, arguably the only protection left to
foreign states is due process protection.1 , The Court, however,
expressly refused to determine 6 whether a foreign state is
entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause of the United
17
States Constitution.
This Note analyzes the Weltover Court's interpretation of the
direct effect clause of the commercial activity exception. Part II

2d Sess. 18 (1976). reprinted In U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6617 [hereinafter HOUSE

REPORT]. Because the House and Senate Committees filed identical reports,
references below to the House Report represent the views of the Senate
Committee as well.
9.
HOUSE REPORr, supra note 8,at 6605.
10.

NATIoNAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, ANNUAL REPORT (1986).

11.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
12.
112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
13.
Id. at 2165-66. See Infra text accompanying notes 133-38.
14.
Id. at 2168. See Infra text accompanying notes 143-48.
15.
See discussion Infra Part V.
16.
The Court assumed, "without deciding, that a foreign state Is a 'person'
for purposes of the Due Process Clause," but did not address whether this status
entitled a foreign state to due process protection. Weltover, 112 S.Ct. at 2169

(citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court sunnarily concluded that minimum
contacts sufficient to satisfy the constitutional test existed in the case at hand. Id.
17.

U.S. CONsT. amend. V. XIV.,§ 1.
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sets forth the legal background and a framework of analysis. Part
III summarizes the Weltover facts and the Supreme Court's
opinion. Part IV first analyzes the Court's decision in light of the

language of the FSIA and the legislative history of the Act. Part IV
then addresses issues unresolved by Weltover and discusses the
problems encountered by lower courts applying Weltover's
holdings and reasoning. This Note concludes that foreign states
should be given due process protection for pragmatic reasons as
well as to avoid a breach of international law.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Between 181218 and 1952 the United States followed a theory
of absolute sovereign immunity, 19 granting foreign nations
In
absolute immunity from suit in United States courts.20
response to developments in international law2 ' and an increase

The United States doctrine of sovereign immunity can be traced to The
18.
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See generally
Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign"Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act. A FunctionalApproach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L.
489, 495 (1992).
See, e.g.. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486
19.
(1983) (noting that courts interpreted The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon as
extending absolute immunity to foreign states); see also Steven A. Torres,
Comment, Foreign SovereignImmunities Act-Argentina's Default on Bonds Payable
in New York Found Sufficient to Deny Immunity, Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of
Argentina, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 761, 764-65
(1993) (stating that under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign
state could not, without its consent, be held to answer in the courts of another

state).
20.
See, e.g., Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (holding
that a court may not exercise Jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign's property
contrary to the will of the executive branch).
21.
HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6607. See also Donoghue, supra note
18. at notes 31-33 and accompanying text. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 5, Immunity of States from
Jurisdiction, introductory note (1986) (even before the Second World War other
states such as Belgium and Italy began to apply the restrictive theory; the
principle spread rapidly after the Second World War). Id. § 451, reporter's note 1

(listing countries that have adopted the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity).
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in commercial activity by foreign governments,2 2 the Department
of State adopted a restrictive principle of foreign sovereign
immunity in the 1952 Tate Letter.2 The restrictive theory limits
foreign state immunity to suits based on the state's public acts;
the theory does not extend immunity to suits involving the state's
commercial or private activities.24
The FSIA, enacted in 1976, codified the restrictive principle of
foreign sovereign immunity. 25 Congress' objectives 26 in passing
27
the Act included: providing a forum for aggrieved plaintiffs;
providing comprehensive procedures for informing a party when it
can assert a legal claim against a foreign state in a United States
court;2 8 transferring the determination of sovereign immunity

from the executive branch 29 to the judicial branch to assure
litigants that immunity determinations are made on legal grounds
and to ensure due process;3 0 and providing a statutory procedure
31
for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state.
Under the FSIA, immunity does not extend to a foreign state
when the state engages in a commercial activity.3 2 The FSIA
defines commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."3

22.
Letter from Jack B. Tate. Acting Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State,
to Phillip B. Pernman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted In 26
DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
23.
Id.
24.
HOUSE REPORr, supranote 8, at 6605.
25.
Id. (stating that Congress' first enumerated objective was to codify the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign Immunity).
26.
An additional congressional objective was to provide the judgment
creditor a remedy if a foreign state failed to satisfy a final judgment after a
reasonable period of time. HOUSE REPORT, supranote 8, at 6606.
27.
See Id. at 6605.
Congress stated that "American citizens are
increasingly coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by foreign
states. These interactions.., call into question whether our citizens will have
access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary legal disputes." Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Prior to the FSIA, courts deferred to decisions of the executive branch
regarding immunity. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945)
(holding that courts cannot deny immunity allowed by the executive branch): see
also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria. 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (stating
that the Court has consistently deferred immunity decisions to the political
branches).
30.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6606.
31.
Id. at 6608.
32.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988): see supra note 6 (setting forth the text of
Section 1605(a)(2)).
33.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
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The Act directs courts to determine the "commercial character" of
an activity by reference to its "nature," not its "purpose."3 ' In the

legislative history of the FSIA, Congress stated that the term

"commercial activity" includes a "broad spectrum of endeavor,"3 5

and that courts have a great deal of leeway in determining what
36
constitutes a commercial activity.
If a commercial activity is extraterritorial to the United

States, immunity may be denied only if the commercial activity
has a direct effect in the United States.3 7 Congress did not define

direct effect in the text of the FSIA. 38

The legislative history

provides some guidance about the meaning of direct effect, stating
that the exercise of Jurisdiction should be consistent with the

principles set forth in Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.3 9 Section 18
essentially requires that the effect of the activity within the
territory be substantial and foreseeable. 4°
If a state is subject to suit in a United States district court
4
under the FSIA, subject matter jurisdiction automatically exists.
The Act further provides that if subject matter jurisdiction exists,
personal jurisdiction also exists 42 as long as proper service of

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6614.
Id. at 6615.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
See td.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988) (definitions used in the Act).
HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6618. Section 18 states:

A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory if either...
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of an
activity to which the rule applies;
(ii)
the effect within the territory Is substanial;
(IiI)
it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965) (emphasis added).
40.
See supra note 39.
41.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988). Section 1330(a) states: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy
of any . . . civil action against a foreign state . . . as to any claim for relief in
personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity...
under sections 1605-1607 of this title .... " Id
42.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1988).
Section 1330(b) states:
"Personal
jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which
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process is made. 4 3 Thus, lack of immunity plus service of process
appear sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction."
In the legislative history of the FSIA, 45 Congress stated that
the required minimum contacts 46 are embodied in the personal

jurisdiction provision of the Act. 47 Congress explained that because each. immunity provision in the Act requires some
connection between the lawsuit in question and the United
States,4 s the immunity provisions themselves prescribe the
necessary contacts that must exist before a4 9United States court
can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state.
B. Pre-Weltover Chaos in the Circuits
Before the Weltover decision, federal courts that applied the
direct effect clause of the commercial activity exception were
divided over three main issues. First, courts used a variety of approaches to determine what constitutes a commercial activity for
purposes of the FSIA. Second, courts disagreed over whether a
direct effect must be substantial and foreseeable. Finally, some
courts required that a foreign state have minimum contacts with
the United States before exercising personal jurisdiction over the
state, whereas other courts did not explicitly require minimum
contacts.
1. Commercial Activity
One United States court of appeals has lamented that the
FSIA provides almost "no guidance at all" in defining commercial

the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been

made under section 1608 of this title." Id.
43.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988) (defining proper service of process
under the Act).
44.
See Nicolas J. Evanoff, Note, Direct Effect JurisdictionUnder the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Ending the Chaos in the CircuitCourts, 28 Hous.
L. REV. 629, 638 & n.61 (1991) (citing testimony at House hearings on the FSIA).
45.
HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6612.
46.
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(stating that due process requires that an absent defendant must have certain
minimum contacts with the forum to be subject to a judgment).
47.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1988).
48.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988); see also supra note 6 (setting
forth the text of Section 1605(a)(2) of the Act).
49.
HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6612.
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activity.5 0 Many courts have struggled with the issue of whether
an act by a foreign state should be considered commercial under
the FSIA.5 ]
To determine if an activity is commercial for purposes of the
FSIA, courts have primarily used two approaches, and in some

instances, courts have combined these approaches.5 2 The private
person test, which most courts use, consists of a two-part
inquiry. The court must first identify the relevant activity, and
then determine whether a private person could engage in the
activity. If a private person could engage in the relevant activity,
53
the act is commercial for the purposes of the FSIA.
The second approach courts have used to ascertain whether
an act is commercial under the FSIA is the sovereign act test.5
Under this test, courts consider whether the activity is a
sovereign or governmental act and therefore not commercial. 5 5
Some courts, after applying the private person test and concluding that foreign sovereign immunity applies, further support their
conclusion by stating that the immune activity is sovereign. 6
Other courts simply label an activity sovereign to justify a finding
57
of immUnity.
A small minority" of courts have used yet another approach
to determine if an act is commercial for purposes of the FSIA.
Despite the FSIA's mandate that the commercial character of an
activity must be determined by considering the nature rather
than the purpose of the activity,5 9 some courts have decided that
an act is commercial by analyzing the foreign state's purpose for
engaging in the activity.60 For instance, the United States Court

50.

Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d

300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981).
See Donoghue, supra note 18, at 494-95 & n.19 (listing a number of
51.
decisions criticizing the commercial activity exception).
52.
53.

Id. at 499-500.
Id.

54.
55.

Id. at 500.
Id.

Id. at 512; see also Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for
56.
N.A. Affairs. 855 F.2d 879, 884-85 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Donoghue. supra note 18, at 512; see also Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871
57.
F.2d 1515, 1522 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
See Donoghue, supra note 18, at 514 (stating that most courts recite
58.

the ban on consideration of purpose contained in § 1603(d) of the Act).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
59.
60.
One commentator has suggested that purpose may also enter a
commercial activity analysis when a court identifies the relevant activity so
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the essence of an act
is often defined by its purpose, and that without determining the

purpose behind a foreign state's act, a court cannot determine the
true nature of the activity.6 1 The court stated that it would have
of the FSIA if it
reached a conclusion contrary to the policies
62
considered only the nature of the transaction.
2. Direct Effect
A controversy involving a commercial activity that occurred
outside the United States may be adjudicated in United States
courts only if the activity had a direct effect in the United
States. 6 3 Courts have been sharply divided on the question of
what constitutes a direct effect for purposes of the FSIA.
Two competing interpretations of the Act's "direct effect in the
United States" 6 language have emerged in the circuits. A
majority of the circuits have used Section 18 of the Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,8 5 cited
by Congress in the legislative history of the FSIA,6 6 for guidance.
69
67
In fact, six circuit courts of appeals -the

Seventh, 70

Ninth, 7 1

Eleventh, 72

Fifth, 6 8 Sixth,

and District of Columbia Cir-

broadly that the purpose of the activity Is considered.

This commentator cites

MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.
1984), in which the Ninth Circuit defined the relevant activity as the regulation of
natural resources rather than the breach of an agreement. Donoghue, supra note

18, at 514.
61.
De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385. 1393 (5th
Cir. 1985).

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1394.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
Id.

65.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 18 (1965). See supra note 39 (setting forth the full text of Section 18).
66.
HOUSE REPORT, supranote 8, at 6618.
See generally Evanoff, supra note 44, at 641-45 (summarizing facts
67.
and holdings of each case listed Infra notes 68-73).
68.
Callejo v. Bancomer. S.A.., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
69.
Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 453 (6th Cir.
1988).
70.
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877
F.2d 574 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989).
71.
Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984).
72.
Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344,
1351 (11th Cir. 1982).
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incorporated Section 18 of the Restatement
cuits, 7 3-have
74
One commentator
into the direct effect analysis.
(Second)
that is direct;
effect
an
summarized this line of cases as requiring
significant in
legally
and
substantial; foreseeable, not fortuitous;
75
loss.
financial
mere
beyond
States,
the United
Declining to follow the reference to Section 18 of the Re78
the
statement (Second) in the legislative history of the FSIA,
statutory
the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals instead looked to
language and broad purposes of the FSIA to determine whether a
77
In
commercial activity had a direct effect in the United States.
78
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. FederalRepublic of Nigeria, the
Second Circuit denounced Congress' reference to Section 18 of
the Restatement (Second) as "a bit of non sequitur since [it] concerns the extent to which substantive American law may be
applied to conduct overseas, not the proper extraterritorial reach
of American courts ... ." 7 The court of appeals concluded that
the substantial and foreseeable requirements of Section 18 of the

Restatement (Second)80 are not relevant to the direct effect clause
of the FSIA because the Act pertains to a United States court's
jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies that took place
extraterritorially.8 3
Accordingly, the Second Circuit formulated its own direct
effect test. The court reasoned that in accordance with the plain
language and the broad purposes of the FSIA,8 2 the true test
should be whether the effect was sufficiently direct and suffihave wanted
ciently within the United States that Congress would
8
a United States court to adjudicate the controversy. 3

Maritime Intl Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693
73.
F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
74.
STATES § 18 (1965).

75.
76.
77.

Evanoff, supranote 44, at 645.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6618.
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d

300 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 311.

80.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 18 (1965).
647 F.2d at 311 & n.32.
81.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
82.
647 F.2d at 313.
83.
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3. Personal Jurisdiction

In addition to disagreement about the proper definition of
commercial activity and direct effect, there has been considerable
controversy about the contacts a foreign state must have with the
United States before a United States court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over the foreign state.
Constitutionally required
"minimum contacts"8 4 are relevant in a traditional personal
jurisdiction analysis.8 5 On the other hand, exceptions to foreign

sovereign immunity, such as the direct effect clause of the
commercial activity exception, 8 6 are relevant in a subject matter
jurisdiction analysis. 8 7
Courts interpreting the direct effect

clause of the commercial activity exception 88 must decide whether
to combine a minimum contacts due process test8 9 with the direct
effect analysis. 90
Two approaches to personal jurisdiction have developed in

the circuit courts. Some courts have interpreted the language of
the direct effect clause 91 and the legislative history 92 of the FSIA
as incorporating a minimum contacts requirement. 93 The Act

84.

In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). the

United States Supreme Court stated that due process requires that an absent
defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum to be subject to
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 516. This statement was clarifled in a subsequent
line of cases which delineated the permissable reach of courts to adjudicate
claims against nonresident defendants. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. -462 (1985).
85.
Hadwin A. Card, Note, Interpreting the Direct Effects Clause of the
FSIA's CommercialActivity Exception, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 91, 92 (1990).
86.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
87.
Card, supra note 85, at 92.
88.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
89.
One of the Reporter's Notes to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States provides that although a foreign state has not
been held to be a person for purposes of the due process clause, it was Congress'
intention that under the FSIA, foreign states would be treated like private entities
for the purpose of determining the necessary contacts with the forum.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 453

reporter's note 3 (1986).
90.
Card, supra note 85, at 91-92.
91.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
92.
HousE REPoRr, supranote 8.
93.
Card, supra note 85, at 97 & n.37. In note 37, the author cites
Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producclon de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980) and Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673,
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itself provides that if any of the exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity apply, subject matter jurisdiction exists. 94 Furthermore, the FSIA provides that if subject matter jurisdiction exists,
personal jurisdiction automatically lies when proper service of
process is made. 95 The legislative history of the FSIA states that
the exceptions to sovereign immunity prescribe the necessary
contacts with the United States required for personal jurisdiction.96 Because the direct effect clause is a statutorily defined
exception to immunity, some courts have concluded that the
direct effect provision itself embodies requisite minimum97contacts,
rendering a separate due process analysis unnecessary.
In recent years, courts have increasingly followed a second
approach to personal jurisdiction in a direct effect analysis. 98
This approach involves a separate analysis of the exceptions to
foreign sovereign immunity under the rubric of subject matter
jurisdiction and a distinct minimum contacts analysis under the
rubric of personal jurisdiction. 99 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first court to clearly
articulate this separate analysis approach to personal juris676 (2d Cir. 1979), both of which held that the direct effect exception to foreign
sovereign immunity embodies the minimum contacts standard.

94.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).

95.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1988).
Regarding personal jurisdiction under the FSIA, the legislative history
96.
of the Act states:
Section 1330(b) provides, in effect, a Federal long-arm statute over foreign
states ....

The requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and

adequate notice are embodied in the provision. Cf. InternationalShoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and McGee v. InternationalLfe Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). For personal jurisdiction to exist under section
1330(b), the claim must first of all be one over which the district courts
have original jurisdiction under section 1330(a), meaning a claim for
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.
Significantly, each of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections
1605-1607, requires some connection between the lawsuit and the United
These immunity provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary
States ....
contacts which must exist before our courts can exercise personal
Jurisdiction.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6612 (footnotes omitted).

97.

See Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. ConseJo Nacional de Produccion de

Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980).
See Card, supra note 85, at 92 (stating that the current trend in federal
98.
courts is to separate minimum contacts analysis from the subject matter
jurisdiction inquiry of sovereign immunity exceptions).
99.
See Id. at 98-99.
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diction. 10( In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. FederalRepublic of
Nigeria, °1 the Second Circuit required a test separate from the
FSIA's immunity exceptions, which provide subject matter jurisdiction,10 2 to determine whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA complies with the Due Process Clause. 103
The Texas Trading due process test first examines whether
the foreign defendant's contacts with the United States are so
numerous that adjudication of the suit in a United States court
"does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice." 104 This standard, in turn, requires four additional inquiries: the extent to which defendants availed themselves of the
privileges of conducting business in the United States; the extent
to which litigation in the United States would be foreseeable to
defendants; the inconvenience to defendants of litigating in the
United States; and the countervailing interest of the United States
in hearing the case. 10 5
Several other courts have adopted the Second Circuit's
approach and have used a separate personal jurisdiction analysis
to ensure that a foreign state has the requisite minimum contacts
with the United States before adjudicating a claim against the
foreign sovereign. 108 However, despite this recent trend,1 0 7 a
number of courts still contend that the sovereign immunity

100. See Id. at 99 & n.43 (stating that the need for a separate analysis of the
sovereign immunity exceptions and due process had been previously recognized
in Decor by Nikkei Intl v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893, 905
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148
(1982)).
101.
647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). cert.denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
103. 647 F.2d'at 308.
104. Id. at 314 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
105. 647 F.2d at 314 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292, 297 (1980); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97
(1978); Hanson v. Denclla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
106. Card, supra note 85, at 98 & n.49 (citing Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871
F.2d 1515, 1530 (9th Cir.), cert. dented, 110 S. Ct. 237 (1989); Harris Corp. v.
National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 1982);
Falcoal, Inc. v. Turkiye Komur Isletmeleri Kurumu, 660 F. Supp. 1536, 1541
(S.D. Tex. 1987); Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 590 F.
Supp. 968, 975-77 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd In part rev'd in part 767 F.2d 998 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)).
107. Card, supranote 85, at 92.
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exceptions of the FSIA alone embody the requisite minimunm
contacts for personal jurisdiction.1 0 8
In summary, United States courts have had difficulty applying the direct effect clause of the FSIA's commercial activity exception since the Act's inception in 1976. Courts have used
multiple approaches to determine whether an act is commercial.
In addition, courts have defined direct effect two different ways.
Finally, courts have taken dramatically contrasting approaches to
personal jurisdiction.

III. THE WELTOVER DECISION

In 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari0 9 in a case
involving the direct effect clause of FSIA's commercial activity
exception to foreign sovereign immunity. In Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover, Inc.,31 ° the Court had the opportunity to resolve the
statutory interpretation problems that had plagued lower courts

since the Act was passed in 1976.

However, Justice Scalia,

writing for a unanimous Court, laconically disposed of the controversy, perhaps raising as many questions as he sought to
answer.
A. The Facts
Because Argentina's currency is not a medium of exchange
on the international market, 1 1 Argentine borrowers traditionally
have had considerable difficulty in obtaining fuilds for foreign
transactions. To address this problem, the Republic of Argentina
and its central bank (collectively Argentina), instituted a foreign
exchange contract program (the FEIC) in 1981.112 Under the
FEIC, Argentina agreed to assume the risk of currency depre-

108. Id. at 98 & n.48 (citing Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.. 764 F.2d 1101,
1110-12 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing only direct effect clause, not due process);
Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1401-02 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(combining direct effect clause analysis with due process analysis)).
109. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 858 (1992).
110. Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
111. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover. Inc., 941 F.2d 145, 147 (2d Cir.

1991) (stating that Argentina's currency, denominated in australs, is not accepted
on the international market and that since the 1970s, Argentina has accumulated
a very large foreign debt).
112. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2168.
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ciation in cross-border transactions involving Argentine borrowers. 113 The FEIC permitted Argentine debtors to pay Argentina a
fixed, predetermined amount of local currency upon maturity of
the foreign debt. Argentina would then give the Argentine debtor
the amount of United States dollars needed to repay the foreign
1 14
debt.
Argentina did not possess sufficient reserves to cover the
FEIC contracts when they became due in 1982,15 and thus the
Argentine debtors could not repay their foreign debts. 1 16 Therefore, as an emergency measure, the Argentine government
refinanced the FEIC-backed debts by issuing government bonds
called "Bonods."1 27 The Bonods gave the foreign creditor the
option of either accepting the Bonods in satisfaction of the debt,
thereby releasing the original debtor and substituting Argentina
as the debtor, or maintaining the original debtor/creditor relationship with the private Argentine debtor and accepting the
Argentine government as guarantor." 8 The Bonods provided for
payment of principal and interest in United States dollars. A
creditor could elect to receive payment on the London, Frankfurt,

Zurich, or New York market.

19

When the Bonods began to mature in 1986, Argentina again
concluded that it lacked sufficient foreign exchange and was
unable to retire the Bonods. 120 Pursuant to a presidential decree,
Argentina extended the time for payment, offering bondholders
12
another substitute instrument. '
The plaintiffs in Weltover, two Panamanian corporations and
a Swiss bank, 122 refused to accept the rescheduling and demanded full payment of the debt in New York.23 When Argentina
failed to pay, the plaintiffs brought a breach of contract action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

113.

Id.

114.

Weltover 941 F.2d at 147.

115.

Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2163.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147-48.
Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2163-64.
Weltover, 941 F.2d at 148.
Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2164.
Id.

121. Id. The substitute instruments were offered as a means of rescheduling the debts. Id.
122. The plaintiffs collectively held $1.3 million of Bonods. Id.
123. Id.
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York, relying on the FSIA for jurisdiction. 1 2 4 The defendants
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 12 5 The

district court denied the defendant's motion, 126 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 127 The
defendants appealed. 12 8

B. The Court's Opinion
A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit,
finding that under the FSIA, Argentina was not immune from the
jurisdiction of United States courts. 12 9 The Court first stated that

unless one of the statutorily defined exceptions of the Act applies,
sovereign immunity protects a foreign state from the adjudication
of a case in United States courts.L3 0 The Court then stated that
the direct effect clause of the commercial activity exception of the
FSIA was the applicable provision in the case before it. 1 31

The

Issues, wrote Justice Scalia, were whether the unilateral
refinancing of the Bonods by Argentina constituted a commercial
activity under the FSIA and whether the refinancing had a direct
13 2
effect in the United States.
After setting forth the statutory definition of commercial
activity,'33 the Court conceded that the FSIA's definition leaves
the term commercial "largely undefined."1 3 ' Therefore, to define
the term, the Court looked to the restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity. 13 5
After discussing a Supreme Court

124.

Id.

125. Id. In addition, defendants moved to dismiss for forum non convenlens.
This motion was also denied. Id.

126.
1991).

Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 753 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y.

127.

Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991).

128.

Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 2164 (1992).

129. Id. at 2164.
130. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988) and Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-439 (1989)).
131. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988)).
132. Id. at 2165.
133. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988)).
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 48689 (1983) and McDermott Intl, Inc. v. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1991) ("[Wle
assume that when a statute uses [a term of art], Congress Intended it to have its
established meaning.")).
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decision issued shortly after the FSIA was enacted, 1386 the Court
held that when a foreign government acts as a private player in
the market, the foreign state's actions are commercial for
purposes of the FSIA. 137 The Court articulated its new commerclal activity test, stating that "the issue is whether the

particular actions that the foreign state performs... are the type
of actions by which a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or
commerce.'" 138

Despite Argentina's claim that the Court should consider the
purpose behind the rescheduling of the debts, 13 9 the Court
deemed this assertion expressly foreclosed by the language of the
FSIA. 14o According to the Court, "it is irrelevant why Argentina
participated in the.., market [as a] private actor; it matters only
that It did so."141 Justice Scalia determined that the Bonods were
"garden-variety debt instruments" and concluded that the
rescheduling of the Borods was analogous to a private
recommercial transaction. Therefore, the Court held that the
142
scheduling constituted a commercial activity under the FSIA.
Next, the Court considered whether Argentina's unilateral
rescheduling of the Bonods had a direct effect in the United
States. 143 The Supreme Court rejected the suggestion lower

136. Id. at 2165-66 (discussingAlfred Dunhll of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976) (a foreign state engaging in commercial activities
[it] exercisels] only those
"doles] not exercise power peculiar to sovereigns ....
powers that can also be exercised by private citizens.")).
137. Id. at 2166.
138. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 270 (6th ed.

1990)). The Supreme Court gave the following examples: "a foreign government's
issuance of regulationslimiting foreign currency exchange Is a sovereign activity,
because such authoritative control of commerce cannot be exercised by a private
party ...
a contract to buy army boots . . Is a "commercial" activity because
private companies can slmilarly use sales contracts to acquire goods." Id.
(emphasis added).

139.

Id. at 2167 (setting forth Argentina's argument that the Bonods are

different than ordinary debt instruments because they were created by the
government of Argentina to fulfill its obligations under a foreign exchange
program that was designed to address a domestic credit crisis and to control the
state's urgent shortage of foreign exchange). Argentina's argument that the Court
should consider the purpose of the act as opposed to solely analyzing Its nature
relied heavily upon De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385
(5th Cir. 1985). Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2167.
140. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2167 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988)).
141.
Id. (emphasis In original).
142. Id. at 2166-67.
143.
Id. at 2168.
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courts had gleaned from Congress' reference to Section 18 of the
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States 1 " that an effect is not direct unless it is both substantial
and foreseeable. 14 5 The Court decided that Section 18 of the
Restatement (Second), cited by Congress in the legislative history
of the FSIA, is inapplicable to a direct effect analysis because
Section 18 deals with jurisdiction to legislate, whereas the FSIA
146
involves jurisdiction to adjudicate.
Before formulating a new direct effect test, the Court
cautioned that jurisdiction may not be based on purely trivial
effects in the United States. 47 Then, using the language of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that a direct effect is an effect that follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's commercial activity.1"
Applying this test to Argentina's actions, Justice Scalia

determined that the rescheduling of the maturity dates of the debt
instruments had a direct effect in the United States. 149 The
Bonod holders had designated New York as the place of payment
of the debt.1 50 Furthermore, Argentina had made some interest
payments into the plaintiffs' New York accounts prior to announcing that it was rescheduling payments. 15 1 Therefore, the

144. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18 (1965). Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) is cited in the
legislative history of the FSIA. HOUSE REPORr, supranote 8, at 6618.
145.
Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2168. The Court cited a list of cases that
employed the substantial and foreseeable test in a FSIA direct effect analysis:
American West Airline, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 798-800 (9th Cir.
1989); Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415, 417-19 (5th Cr. 1987). cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988); Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic
of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1110-11 (D.C. Cr. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815
(1983); Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1286 (E.D. Pa.

1981), aff'd, 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985).
146.

Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2168. The Court stated that the passage of the

House Report suggesting the application of Section 18 to a direct effect analysis
has "been charitably described as 'a bit of a non sequitur.'" Id. (quoting Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 311 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982)).
147. Id. The Court stated that the "principle de minimis non curat lex
ensures that Jurisdiction may not be predicated upon purely trivial effects in the
United States." Id.
148. Id. (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 941 F.2d 145, 152
(2d Cir. 1991)).
149. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2168.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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Court concluded that because New York was the place of performance of Argentina's contractual obligations, and because
money that was supposed to be delivered to a New York bank was
not forthcoming, the rescheduling of the obligation had a direct
152
effect in the United States.
Finally, the Weltover Court considered whether finding jurisdiction in the case at hand would violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1 5 3 Argentina asserted that the
Court must construe the direct effect clause as requiring the
1 54
minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.
In
response,
the
Supreme
Court
assumed-without
deciding-that a foreign state is a person for purposes of the Due
Process Clause.1 5 5 Paradoxically, as if to cast doubt on this assumption, the Court parenthetically cited South Carolina v.
Katzenbach 5 6 for the proposition that individual states of the
United States are not persons for purposes of the Due Process
Clause.1 5 7 Justice Scalia determined that in any event, Argentina
had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to satisfy
the constitutional test.1 5 8 Because Argentina had purposely
availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the United

152. Id. The Supreme Court set forth the court of appeals' direct effect
analysis. The lower court had concluded that the effect of rescheduling the debts

was sufficiently In the United States because Congress would have wanted a
United States court to hear the case in order to preserve New York City's status
as a major commercial center. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 941 F.2d 145,
153 (2d Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court stated that the question is not what
Congress would have wanted but what was enacted in the FSIA. Although the
Court concluded that a direct effect existed in the case at hand, the Court found
that diminishing New York's status as a world financial leader was too remote and
attenuated an effect to satisfy the direct effect requirement of the FSIA. Weltover,
112 S. Ct. at 2168.
In addition, the Supreme Court rejected Argentina's argument that the direct
effect requirement was not satisfied because the plaintiffs were foreign companies
with no other connection to the United States. The Court stated that the FSIA
permits a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign sovereign in United States courts as
long as the requirements of the FSIA are satisfied. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2168
(quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983)).
153.
Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2169.154. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
155.
Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2169.
156. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
157. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2169. The Court seemed to be implying that if
states of the Union are not persons entitled to due process protection, then
foreign states are not entitled to due process either. See Infra text accompanying
notes 315-16.
158. Id.
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States15 9 by issuing debt instruments payable in New York and
denominated in United States dollars and by appointing a
financial agent in New York, the Court concluded that the district
court had properly exercised jurisdiction over Argentina. 160

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Weltover and the FSIA
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. represents the only
major recent Supreme Court decision focusing on the direct effect
clause of the commercial activity exception. 1 1 Prior to Weltover,
lower courts had great difficulty applying the direct effect
clause. 162 By narrowly reading the legislative history and the text
of the FSIA, the Supreme Court in Weltover resolved some issues
that had long divided the lower courts. However, the Court
declined to determine whether foreign states are entitled to due
process protection, thereby leaving a significant constitutional
question unanswered.
1. Commercial Activity
Like the majority of lower courts that had considered the
issue,1'3 the Supreme Court adopted the private person test for
determining whether a foreign sovereign's act is commercial for
purposes of the FSIA. The private person test is aligned with the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which limits the

immunity of a foreign state to cases based on its public acts and

159.

Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)

(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
160. Id.
161. The Weltover decision is the first foreign sovereign immunity case
decided by the Supreme Court since the 1980s. In the 1980s, the Court decided
two major FSIA cases, Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480
(1983) and Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428
(1989). The Court decided an FSIA case the term after the Weltover decision, but
at issue in the case was the first clause of the commercial activity exception.
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
162. See supra Part I.B.
163. See supra text accompanying note 53 (defining the private person test
and stating that most courts use this test).
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does not extend immunity to controversies involving the state's
private commercial activities. 1 8 '

In the legislative history of the

FSIA, Congress stated that the Act codifies this widely accepted
theory of foreign sovereign immunity. 16 5 Moreover, because the
FSIA provides1 only a tautological definition of the term
"commercial," 6 the restrictive theory is a logical place to turn for
guidance.
Although the Court's private person test is extremely broad,
the legislative history of the FSIA appears to sanction this expansive test. In the Act's legislative history, Congress stated that
the term "commercial activity" includes a broad spectrum of endeavor and that courts should have wide latitude to determine
what acts are commercial. 67 As one court wrote, the language
and legislative history of the Act "authorize[I courts to cast the net
wide."IL6
Notably, the Supreme Court placed a significant check on the
private person test. The Court confined the commercial activity
inquiry to the nature of the act and expressly refused to consider
the foreign state's purpose for engaging in the activity. 169 This
holding forecloses the consideration of purpose in a commercial
activity analysis, 170 an approach used by a small minority of
courts prior to the Weltover decision. 71 The Supreme Court's
result fits squarely within the language of the FSIA, which

164.

HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6605.

165.

Congress' first objective was to codify the restrictive theory of foreign

sovereign Immunity. Congress noted that it is the theory "presently recognized In
international law." Id.

166.

Donoghue, supra note 18, at 499 (stating that the FSIA definition of

commercial activity, under which either a regular course of conduct or a
particular transaction may be considered commercial by reference to the nature
of the activity, not Its purpose, is tautological).
167. HousE REPoRT, supra note 8. at 6614-15.
168.
Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, No. 91-2530, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21643, at *7 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1992) (quoting Texas Trading & Milling Corp.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981)).
169. Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2167 (1992).
170. In DJordJevich v. Bundesminister der Finanzen, 827 F. Supp. 814
(D.D.C. 1993). the district court considered whether a commercial activity had
occurred in the case before it by referring to the purpose of the act. Id at 817.
Although this language is dicta because the court based its holding on the fact
that the activity caused no direct effect in the United States, DJordJevichsuggests
that some courts may still consider the purpose of the foreign state's activity.
171.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
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provides that courts should not consider the purpose behind a
172
foreign state's act.
2. Direct Effect
Although the FSIA does not define the direct effect language
used in Section 1605(a)(2) of the Act, l7 3 the legislative history
does state that jurisdiction based on the direct effect clause
should be consistent with Section 18 of the Restatement (Second)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.' 7 4 Prior to the
Weltover decision, a majority of the circuits required a substantial
and foreseeable direct effect in the United States in accordance
with Section 18 of the Restatement (Second).17 5 The Second
Circuit, on the other hand, repudiated the notion that an effect
must be substantial and foreseeable to be direct.' 78
The Supreme Court ended this debate, holding that the direct
effect clause does not contain an unexpressed requirement of
substantiality or foreseeability.' 7 7 The Weltover Court echoed the
Second Circuit's characterization of Section 18 of the Restatement

(Second), stating that Congress' reference to Section 18 is a "non
sequitur"178 because Section 18 involves jurisdiction to7 9legislate,
whereas the FSIA pertains to jurisdiction to adjudicate.1
Disregarding the reference to Section 18, the Supreme Court
formulated its own definition of direct effect. The Court stated
that a direct effect is one that flows as an immediate consequence
of a foreign state's commercial activity. 180 Because direct effect is
not defined in the FSIA, the prudence of disregarding Congress'
citation to Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) in the
legislative history is questionable. A significant concern is that

172. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
173. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
177. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2168 (1992).
178. Id. (quoting Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 1981)).

179.

One commentator has stated that labeling Congress' reference to

Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) a non sequitur ignores that under both
international and domestic law, specific jurisdiction to adjudicate (at issue in
FSIA cases) depends on jurisdiction to prescribe (at issue in Section 18). JOSEPH
W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 91 (1988).
180. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2168.
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the Supreme Court did not give effect to Congress' intent as
expressed in the legislative history of the Act and instead substituted its own meaning of direct effect. One commentator has
suggested that Congress' intent was not to incorporate the
substantive law of Section 18, but merely to provide general
guidance to lower courts.1 8 1 This theory is bolstered by the
language of the legislative history, 18 2 which states only that the
exercise of jurisdiction should be "consistent with the principles
set forth in Section 18." 18 3 Arguably, then, the Supreme Court's
hasty dismissal of Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) does
not effectuate Congress' intent.
On the other hand, Weltover's broad reading of direct effect
may in fact comport with Congress' intent. Perhaps in formulating its liberal direct effect test the Supreme Court sought to carry
out Congress' objective to provide a forum for aggrieved
plaintiffs. 184 However, the wisdom of such a rationale is dubious
because Congress may well have included the reference to Section
18 as a limiting factor. Although Congress wanted to afford
United States plaintiffs the option of litigating a commercial
dispute against a foreign sovereign in the United States, it is

unlikely that Congress wanted United States courts to become a
clearing house for commercial disputes only marginally connected
to the United States.' 85 In sum, the motivation behind the
Supreme Court's dismissal of Congress' reference to Section 18 of
the Restatement (Second) in the Act's legislative history is
unclear. The Court may have attempted to fill a statutory gap
with a judicially fashioned definition of direct effect. Alternatively,
the Court may have attempted to give effect to the broad
objectives of the FSIA.
181. Lawrence V. Ashe, The Flexible Approach to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act In Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 23 INTER AM. L. REV. 465,
488 (1991).
182. Id.at 488.
183. HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 8, at 6618 (emphasis added).
184. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
185. See United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, No.
93-1193, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23684, at *16 (10th Cir. Aug. 29, 1994) (stating

that "Congress was concerned our courts [might be] turned into small
international courts of claimsi,... open... to all comers to litigate any dispute
which any private party might have with a foreign state anywhere in the world")
(quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S 480 (1983)). See also
Matthew P. McGuire, Note, DirectEffect Jurisdictionin the 90's: Weltover, Inc. v.
Republic of Argentina and a Broad Interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign
ImmunitiesAct of 1976, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 383, 394 (1992).

1994)

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITYAFTER WELTOVER

697

3. Personal Jurisdiction
In Weltover, the Supreme Court did not clarify a particularly
troublesome issue that divided lower courts faced with an immunity determination under the direct effect clause of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA. The Court refused to
decide whether a foreign state is entitled to due process
protection,186 leaving unresolved the issue of whether the direct
effect provision of the Act incorporates a minimum contacts
analysis, or whether a separate due process analysis is necessary.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the constitutional requirement
of minimum contacts was satisfied in the case at hand because
Argentina had purposely availed itself of the privileges of United
187
States law.
The origin of the dichotomy in the Court's due process
analysis may be traced to the legislative history and language of
the FSIA. On the one hand, Congress stated in the legislative
history that the purpose of the Act includes both providing a
statutory procedure for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state and ensuring due process. 18 8 Taken together, these
objectives arguably suggest that Section 1330(b), which provides
that personal jurisdiction exists if subject matter jurisdiction lies
and proper service of process has been made, I8 9 sets forth only
the statutory requirements of personal jurisdiction, and that a
separate due process analysis must be undertaken to satisfy
constitutional requirements.' L9
On the other hand, the plain
language' 9 1 and legislative history1 9 2 accompanying Section
1330(b) seem to suggest that minimum contacts are embodied in
the Act, making a separate due process analysis superfluous. 9 3
The Weltover Court shied away from this quagmire, leaving lower

186. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (1992).
187. Id. (stating that Argentina had purposely availed itself of the privilege
of conducting business in the United States by issuing debt instruments payable

in the United States in United States currency and by appointing a financial agent
in New York).
188. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6606.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1988).
190. Several lower courts have used this approach when applying the direct
effect clause of the FSIA. See supranotes 98-106 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 42.

192.

See supra note 96.

193. Several lower courts have followed this approach to personal
Jurisdiction when applying the direct effect clause of the Act. See supra notes 9197 and accompanying text.
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courts without even a foothold on the issue of personal
jurisdiction.
B. The Aftermath: Issues Unresolved by Weltover
Soon after the Weltover decision, one court facing a
commercial activity exception determination commented that the

task of interpreting the FSIA is no easier now than it was in the
past.1 94 Although Weltover comports with the language and
legislative history of the FSIA for the most part, it offers little
guidance to lower courts. Indeed, the Court's cursory resolution
of vital FSIA issues has left many questions unanswered, perhaps
creating more confusion than it resolved.
1. Commercial Activity
The Weltover Court criticized Congress' definition of commercial activity in the FSIA, noting that Congress' language essentially leaves the key term commercial undefined. 19 5
Admittedly, the FSIA provides only that a commercial act can be
either a regular course of conduct or a specific transaction, and
that the commercial character of the activity must be determined
by considering the nature, not the purpose, of the act.1 98 The
Court attempted to add to this diffident definition 1 9 7 by adopting
the private person test used by many lower courts, holding that
when a foreign sovereign acts like a private player In the marketplace, the foreign state's acts are commercial for purposes of the
FSIA. 198

194. Tubular Inspectors, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexlcanos, 977 F.2d 180, 181-82
(5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos. 923 F.2d 380,
382 (5th Cir. 1991)).
195. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2165 (1992).

The Court quoted the FSIA definition of commercial activity: "[Elither a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the...
act, rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)
(1988)).
196.

28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).

197.

The Supreme Court itself characterized the FSIA definition of
commercial as diffident in Saudi Arabi v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1478 (1993).
After setting forth the definition of commercial in Section 1603(d) of the Act the Court
stated, "Ifthis is a definition, it Is one distinguished only by its diffidence .... " Id.
198. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2166 ("[W]hen a foreign government acts, not as

regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign

1994)

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNIYAFTER WELTOVER

699

Although the private person test may appear to clarify
Congress' definition of commercial, it opens a Pandora's box of its

own. One commentator has articulated two major flaws in the
private person test.1 09 First, the relevant activity is often very
difficult to identify in a complex case. 2 0° Second, whether or not
a foreign state's act is analogous to a private commercial

transaction turns on how the court defines the relevant activity,

20 1
which often may be subject to more than one interpretation.
In the factually complex case of Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for AW. Galadar,20 2 the

sovereign's actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of the FSIA."); see also
supra text accompanying note 53.
199. Donoghue, supra note 18, at 500-12.
200. Id. at 501. The author notes that some courts have failed to identify a
relevant activity at all. Id. at 503-04; see, e.g., State Bank of India v. NLRB. 808
F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1986).
201.
Donoghue, supra note 18, at 511. The author laments that Weltover's
private person test does not suggest what features would transform a transaction
that is otherwise commercial into a sovereign action. She writes, "[C]ourts are
still left with a private person test that Is unduly formalistic and easily
manipulated." Id. at 510.
202.
12 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1993) (DrexelVIII). The procedural history of the
Drexel case is very complicated as well. The court of appeals issued one prior
opinion, and the district court issued several. See Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985) (Drexel II), affg in part and
vacating In part, 610 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Drexel 1); Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, No. 84 Civ. 2602 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 1986) (Drexel
I ), Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, No. 84 Civ. 2602, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5030 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1987) (Drexel IV); Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 134 B.R. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Drexel V); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 127 B.R. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Drexel
VI). The district court decision from which this appeal was taken is Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for A.W. Galadari, 810
F. Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Drexel VI).
Initially, Drexel sued Galadari to recover the past due debt.
Then, a
committee was established by royal decree to wind up the affairs of Galadari, who
was insolvent. Therefore, the committee answered Drexers complaint, setting
forth various affirmative defenses (but not asserting the defense of foreign
sovereign immunity). Drexel moved for summary judgment, but the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint
based on international comity. Drexel 1. 610 F. Supp. at 118-19.
Drexel
appealed, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but vacated the
dismissal and remanded for a hearing on the question of whether comity called

for deference to the committee's proceedings in Dubai. Drexel 11, 777 F.2d at 88182.
Drexel then moved to enjoin the committee from adjudicating the claim in
Dubai. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
initially denied Drexel's application for a preliminary injunction, Drexel IlI, slip op.
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district court and the court of appeals disagreed about how to
apply Weltover's private person test. In Drexel, the sovereign of
Dubai issued a decree establishing a committee to wind up the
business affairs and liquidate the assets of Galadari, an insolvent
citizen of Dubai. 20 3 Dubai issued the decree in response to a
financial crisis in the state precipitated by the potential collapse
of the Union Bank of the Middle East (UBME), which the insolvent
The committee, comprised of four
Galadari controlled. 20 4
prominent citizens of Dubai, had the authority to liquidate

Galadari's remaining assets, pay his creditors, and bring and
defend actions on behalf of the Galadari "estate."2 05 Dissatisfied
claimants could appeal decisions20 of the committee to a special
three-member judicial committee.
The Drexel action, initiated in 1985,207 stemmed from large
trading losses incurred by Galadari and covered by Drexel.
Galadari gave Drexel a promissory note secured by a pledge of
UBME stock. 20 8 When Galadari defaulted on payments of the
note, plaintiff Drexel participated in proceedings before the9
20
committee seeking recovery of the debt owed by Galadari.
Payment of the debt did not follow, so Drexel commenced suit

available In LEXIS, GENFED Library, 2 Dist. File, at 01-2, but later found the
committee proceedings fair and stayed the United States action pending the
resolution of Drexel's complaint In Dubai in Drexel IV, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5030 at *49.
In June 1991, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York lifted the stay on the United States proceedings. In Drexel VHi, the
district court denied motions by Dubai and the committee to dismiss the Drexel
complaint on the basis that the defendants were entitled to foreign sovereign
immunity. Drexel VII, 810 F. Supp. at 1377, 1381-88. A timely appeal followed,
and a divided panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding
that Dubai and the committee were entitled to foreign sovereign immunity. Drexel
V!I, 12 F.3d at 317.
203. Drexel VII, 12 F.3d at 319.
204. Id. Galadari had severe financial problems traceable to mismanagement of the Union Bank of the Middle East (UBME). Earlier decrees had
established a provisional board of directors of the UBME to manage the bank,
vest the assets of Galadari and his companies in the board, freeze all of his
liabilities, and begin the liquidation of his assets. Drexel VII, 810 F. Supp. at
1377-78.
205. Drexel VIII, 12 F.3d at 319-20 (quotations in original).
206. Id.
207. See Drexel 1,610 F. Supp. at 114.
208. Drexel VI, 12 F.3d at 320. The promissory note owed by Galadari was
in the amount of $19,465,000 and secured by 6,068,640 shares of UBME stock.
Id.
209. Drexel VII, 810 F. Supp. at 1378.
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against Dubai and the committee in the United States District
that Dubai
Court for the Southern District of New York, 2claiming
10
and the committee confiscated Drexel's claim.
The district court found that the committee and Dubai were
not immune from jurisdiction because they engaged in a com2 11
mercial activity which had a direct effect in the United States.
After noting that the FSIA definition of commercial activity
"should be interpreted broadly to encompass a wide range of acts
as the relevant activity in a given matter," 212 the court recited the
private person test espoused by the Supreme Court in
2 13
Weltover.
The district court then determined that the relevant activities

in the case before it were the marshalling, liquidating, and
winding up of Galadari's remaining assets.2 14 In essence, Dubai,
through the committee, took over and managed UBME, a private
bank. 2 15 The court recognized that the committee exercised
quasi-judicial functions as well, but concluded that the committee
an
engaged in a commercial act because it managed UBME,
2 16
activity previously conducted by a private person, Galadari.
In contrast to the district court, a majority of the Second
Circuit panel that decided Drexel conceded that the activities discussed by the district court might be commercial 2 1 7 but did not

210. Id.
211. Id. at 1385-88.
212. Id. at 1385 (citing Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981)).
213. Drexel VII, 810 F. Supp. at 1385-86 (quoting Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (1992)).
214. Drexel VII, 810 F. Supp. at 1386.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1386-87. The court stated: "While the Committee has served in
a quasi-judicial capacity, the Committee has also acted in commercial and nonJudicial capacities. This court's jurisdiction is based on the latter." Id. at 1391.
The district court went on to find that the commercial acts had a direct effect
in the United States. The court wrote, "When Dubai and the Committee took over
the control and management of Galadari's assets and refused to pay debts owed
Drexel ...and payable in the United States, Dubai and the Committee produced
a 'direct effect' in the United States." Id. at 1388. Because the acts of the
committee and Dubai satisfied the direct effect clause of the commercial activity
exception of the FSIA, the district court refused to dismiss Drexel's complaint. Id.
at 1393.
217. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for
A.W. Galadarl, 12 F.3d 317. 329 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the
characterization of these activities as commercial Is suspect). The court cited In
re Beck Industries, 725 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1984) for the proposition that
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agree that the management and liquidation of Galadari's assets
were the relevant activities. The court of appeals stated that
Drexel's complaint claimed that (1) the committee and Dubai were
responsible as successors-in-interest for Galadari's liabilities, (2)
the committee and Dubai breached a promise to Drexel that its
claim would be adjudicated fairly in Dubai, and (3) the committee's wrongful refusal to pay Drexel's claim was an illegal taking of property without just compensation. 2 15
The court of
appeals decided that the gravamen of Drexel's claim involved the
judicial role of the committee, not any related commercial conduct
2 19
of the committee or Dubai.
The court of appeals concluded that the committee's resolution of competing claims for Galadari's assets was not an act
that could have been performed by a private party. 2 20 Accordingly, it found that the commercial activity exception did not strip
221
the defendants of foreign sovereign immunity.

Chief Judge Newman, one of the three presiding judges on
the Second Circuit panel reviewing Drexel, dissented. He concluded that a decision about the nature of the challenged acts
could not be made on the face of the complaint because the acts
of Dubai and the committee blended adjudicative and commercial
activities. 22 2 Chief Judge Newman characterized the actions of

the committee as both similar to those of a United States
bankruptcy court (because the committee determined the rights of
Galadari's creditors) and similar to a new corporation emerging
from a Chapter 11 reorganization (because the committee took
over and operated Galadari's ventures).2 2 Chief Judge Newman
found that only upon a development of the facts would It be
possible to determine whether the committee's role was
"essentially judicial" as the majority stated. 2 24

"merely to attempt to collect and liquidate the assets of a debtor Is not to carry on
its business in any proper sense of the term." Drexel VIII, 12 F.3d at 329 n.3.
218. Drexel VIII, 12 F.3d at 329 n.3.
219. Id. at 329.
220. Id. at 331.
221. Id.
222. I& at 330.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 332. Chief Judge Newman suggested that it is possible that the
committee, in a role similar to a successor corporation, used cash from Its "parent
entity" to give preferential treatment to certain creditors and simply reneged on
the obligation to discharge liabilities to Drexel. Id.
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The differences in the opinions of the district court, the
Second Circuit Drexel majority, and the Second Circuit Drexel
dissent aptly illustrate the difficulty of determining the relevant
activity in a factually complex case. While some of the activities
of the committee had Judicial characteristics, other activities had
commercial attributes, and still others shared both judicial and
commercial traits. The district court focused on the commercial
aspects of the committee's acts-the management and liquidation
of Galadari's assets. 2 25 The majority of the court of appeals
focused on the judicial portion of the committee's acts-the
Chief
resolution of competing claims to Galadari's assets. 2 28
Judge Newman, in dissent, acknowledged that both judicial and
unclear which
commercial activities were involved and that it was
227
type of act was the predominant or relevant one.
The Drexel case also demonstrates the importance of determining the relevant act. Whether the committee's acts were
analogous to private commercial transactions, and therefore not

entitled to immunity, turned on how the court defined the
relevant activity. The district court concluded that the commercial acts of the committee could have been carried on by a
private party and based its finding of jurisdiction under the FSIA
on these acts. 22s The majority of the court of appeals, however,
determined that the judicial activities of the committee could not
have been carried on by a private party 22 9 and granted sovereign
immunity to Dubai and the committee. 2 30 Each court focused on
a different relevant activity, and each made a different immunity
determination.
Thus, Drexel illustrates the magnitude of a fundamental flaw
of the Weltover private person test: The test offers no guidance as
to how courts should ascertain the relevant activity, and focusing
on one activity may permit the court to adjudicate a matter, while
focusing on another may lead to the dismissal of the case. With
no definition of relevant activity, Weltover's private person test is
easily manipulated in complex cases. 23 1

225. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
227. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 219-20.
230. See supra text accompanying note 221.
231. The flaws of the private person test are also illustrated by a Supreme
Court case decided the term after Weltover. In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct.
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2. Direct Effect
At first glance, Weltover appears to have settled the question
of what constitutes a direct effect for purposes of the third clause
1471 (1993), the Supreme Court applied the first clause of the commercial
activity exception. Nelson involved the alleged detention and torture of a United
States employee who was recruited in the United States. Three separate opinions
were written in which the justices disagreed about what the relevant act was and
whether the act was a commercial activity for purposes of the FSIA.
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter recited the private person test
articulated in Weltover, stating that "whether a state acts 'in the manner of a
private party is a question of behavior, not motivation." Id. at 1479. The majority
held that the alleged wrongful arrest, Imprisonment, and torture of Nelson by
Saudi Arabian authorities was an abuse of police power, a power which is
sovereign in nature. Id. Therefore, the majority concluded that Nelson's action
was not based on a commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA and
accordingly dismissed the case for lack ofjurisdiction. Id at 1481.
Justice White and Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's
characterization of the alleged misconduct as a sovereign, non-commercial act,
Id. at 1481. Nelson was allegedly detained and tortured because he reported
safety hazards. Id. Justice White noted that retaliation for whistle blowing is not
an unknown practice in the marketplace, and that in the past private employers
have retaliated, with the help of the police force, by falsely arresting employees.
Id. at 1481-82. Justice White and Justice Blackmun concluded that in the case
at hand, "the state-owned hospital was engaged in ordinary commercial
business." Id. at 1484.
Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, and Stevens disagreed with the majority about
what the relevant activity was. Nelson claimed that the hospital and Saudi Arabia
were negligent in failing to warn Nelson of foreseeable dangers during his
recruitment. Id. at 1485. Justice Kennedy, writing for the other two justices,
found that the omission of important information during recruitment is a
commercial activity under the FSIA because recruiting employees is an activity
routinely engaged in by private hospitals: "Locating and hiring employees
implicates no power unique to the sovereign." Id. at 1485.
Like Drexel, Nelson illustrates the fatal flaw of Weltover's private person test:
Weltover offers no guidance in determining the relevant activity, and how a
relevant activity is defined Is often determined by whether a private party could
engage in the act. The significance of ascertaining the relevant act is apparent
once again: In Nelson, different relevant acts led to different determinations of
immunity. The majority targeted the relevant act as the alleged false
imprisonment and torture of Nelson. Concluding that this act was a sovereign
activity Involving the police power, the majority held that Saudi Arabia and the
hospital were immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts. On the other
hand, Justice Kennedy pinpointed the relevant activity as the failure, during
recruitment, to warn of employment-related dangers, which he determined is not
a commercial activity. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy would have remanded the
case to the district court for further consideration. The separate opinion of
Justice White illustrates that even when the Court can agree on the relevant act,
the Justices still might differ as to whether a private party could engage in the
activity.
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of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA. The Court did
resolve a circuit splitas2 by rejecting the notion that the direct

effect clause contains a requirement of substantiality or foreseeability. However, the Court's definition of direct effect--"an
effect is 'direct' if it follows 'as an immediate consequence of the
defendant's . . . activity'"2-still leaves room for a variety of

interpretations.
Like the Court's commercial activity definition, Weltover's
spartan direct effect test has already caused disagreement among

lower courts. In Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras,24 the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
expansively interpreted Weltover's already broad definition of

direct effect. Ampac involved a dispute over a contract between
Ampac and the Republic of Honduras for the purchase of a
cement company owned by Honduras. After signing a contract of
sale,2 5 Ampac allegedly tendered 2.7 million dollars in Honduran
The Honduran
foreign debt for the cement company.2 6
legislature did not approve the sale, a prerequisite for the sale of a
company owned by the Honduran government. 237 Honduras
Therefore,
never transferred the cement company to Ampac. 2
Ampac instituted proceedings alleging breach of contract and
fraud. 239 Honduras moved to dismiss the action on the ground
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA. o
To establish subject matter jurisdiction, Ampac invoked the
direct effect clause of the commercial activity exception. 241 To
refute the applicability of this FSIA provision, the Republic of
Honduras asserted that the cited activities did not cause a direct
effect in the United States. 24 - The district court began its

232. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
233. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (1992)
(quoting Weltover. Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir.
1991)).
234. 797 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
235. Id. at 975. Defendant denied that the document was an enforceable,
binding contract and claimed instead that it was an agreement in principle. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
Id.
238.

239.

Id. at 977.

240.
241.
242.

Id. at 975.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 977.
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analysis by reciting the Weltover direct effect test.24 3 The court
interpreted the Weltover language to mean that the effect in the
United States need only be slight, and the contact with the United
States may be only tangential to support FSIA jurisdiction. 2 "
The court concluded that Ampac's allegations of breach of
contract and fraud clearly supported jurisdiction under the FSIA
because Ampac, an American corporation, suffered a financial
loss as a direct effect of the Republic of Honduras's commercial
activities. 245
In United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production
Associaton,m the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado squarely rejected the Ampac direct effect test, choosing
instead to interpret Weltover's direct effect language narrowly. 2 47
United World Trade involved an alleged breach of a contract for
crude oil between plaintiff United World Trade (UWT) and
defendants Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Association 248 and
Kazakhstan Commerce Foreign Economic Association (the
defendants).2 4 9 After making one delivery of oil, the defendants
allegedly refused to supply the additional oil to UWT in breach of
25 0
the parties' preliminary agreement.
UWT asserted that the defendants were not protected from
suit in a United States court by the doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity because the defendants engaged in a commercial
activity which had a direct effect in the United States. 25 1 Relying
on Ampac, UWT argued that the effect in the United States of a
commercial act need only be slight to warrant the exercise of

jurisdiction. 2 2

The district court flatly rejected Ampac's inter-

pretation of Weltover's direct effect test in favor of a more rigid
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court also looked to Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 1981), to support Its conclusion
that a financial loss of a United States corporation is a direct effect. Id.
246. 821 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Colo. 1993), affirmed. United World Trade, Inc.
v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n, No. 93-1193, 1994 U.S. App. LEIS
23684 (10th Cir. Aug. 29. 1994).
247. United World Trade, 821 F. Supp. at 1408.
248. MOP is an organization of industrial enterprises and is wholly owned
by the Republic of Kazakhstan. Id. at 1407.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1408.
252. Id. (citing Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp.
973, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1992)).
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Instead, the United World Trade court held that
standard.25
happen in the United States
something "legally significant" 2must
5
for FSIA jurisdiction to attach. '
The district court found that the activities of the defendants
did not cause a direct effect in the United States. First, the court
rejected the notion that mere financial loss suffered by a
corporation in the United States as a result of a foreign state's
acts abroad constitutes a direct effect alone sufficient to create
subject matter jurisdiction. 25 5 Then, the court concluded that the
terms of the contract caused no direct effect in the United
States. 256 The only references to the United States in the crude
oil contract were the mention of a "first class European/USA
bank" and procedures to be followed if a payment was due on a
New York banking holiday.25 7

Although a New York bank per-

formed the currency exchange, the terms of the contract did not
require this monetary conversion.. Furthermore, the district court
noted that except for a transfer of funds that occurred after the oil
transaction, all of the commercial activity in this case took place
outside the United States. 2 5s The court determined that the

purchase, sale, and delivery of the oil, as well as the payment for

the oil, had no connection with the United States. 2 59 The court
concluded that the losses allegedly suffered by UWT as a result of
the defendants' actions abroad were not "legally significant" and,
2
hence, did not constitute a direct effect in the United States. 6
Because the allegedly illegal activity did not have a sufficient
nexus with the United States to pierce the shield of foreign
it did
sovereign immunity, the United World Trade court held that
26 1
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants.
The Ampac and United World Trade cases illustrate two
dramatically different twists lower courts have put on Weltover's
direct effect test. The Ampac approach, requiring that an effect

253. Id.
254. United World Trade, 821 F. Supp. at 1409 (quoting Zedan v. Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
255. Id. (quoting Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989)).
256. United World Trade, 821 F. Supp. at 1409.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. (quoting Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1515
(D.C. Cir. 1988) and citing Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir.
1989)).
261. United World Trade, 821 F. Supp. at 1409-10.
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need only be slight or tangential to be direct, may appear to be an
extreme reading of Weltover. However, Weltover broadly defined
direct effect as an "immediate consequence;" 2 6 2 nothing in
Weltover expressly forecloses the Ampac Court's interpretation of
this language. The Weltover opinion limited the direct effect test
only by providing that jurisdiction may not be based on "purely
trivial effects in the United States."2 3 Likewise, nothing in
Weltover prohibits United World Trade's additional requirement of
a "legally significant act" before a sufficient direct effect in the
United States is found.
Although Weltover's direct effect test resolved a circuit split
by rejecting the notion that a direct effect must be both substantial and foreseeable, it offered little guidance beyond this
narrow issue. The Court's barren definition of direct effect
requires lower courts to rely on prior case law to determine
exactly what constitutes a direct effect.
The contrasting
treatment of financial loss in the Ampac and United World Trade
cases aptly illustrates this forced reliance. In Ampac, the court
cited Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria2 6 for the proposition that when a corporation is involved,

the proper inquiry under the direct effect clause Is whether the

corporation has suffered a direct financial loss. 26 r On the other
hand, the United World Trade Court quoted Gregorian v.
Izvestia 286 in support of its conclusion that mere financial loss
suffered by a plaintiff in the United States because of acts by a
foreign state abroad does not create a direct effect. 2 67 Because

262. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2168 (1992).
263. Id. As if to illustrate this point, the Court held that the effect of
Argentina rescheduling the repayment of the Bonods upon New York's status as a
world financial leader is "too remote and attenuated to satisfy the 'direct effect'
requirement of the FSIA." Id.
264. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
265. Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 977
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (quoting Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 1981)).
266. 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989).
267. United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 821 F. Supp.
1405, 1409 (D. Colo. 1993); see also Chu v. Taiwan Tobacco & Wine Monopoly
Bureau, Nos. 93-15537, 93-15562, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 20209 (9th Cir. July
29, 1994) (holding that financial loss alone is not enough to constitute a direct
effect).
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conflicting
Weltover's direct effect language is so obfuscatory,
2 68
unusual.
be
not
will
facts
similar
results involving
3. Personal Jurisdiction
Unlike the terms commercial activity and direct effect, which
the Supreme Court addressed, the Weltover Court flatly refused to
determine whether a foreign state is entitled to due process
protection. The Supreme Court gave several conflicting signals
regarding the personal jurisdiction requirements in an FSIA direct

effect analysis. These conflicting signals have resulted in a convoluted opinion that has proved very difficult for lower courts to
apply.
First, the Court assumed-without deciding-that a foreign
26 9
state is a person for purposes of the Due Process Clause.
Immediately thereafter, the Court cited South Carolina v.
Katzenbach270 to support the proposition that a state of the Union
is not a person for purposes of the Due Process Clause. 2 71 With
this parenthetical citation, the Court seemed to imply that if a
state of the Union is not entitled to due process protection,
neither is a foreign state. Despite this implication, the Court used
an abbreviated minimum contacts analysis. It concluded that "by
issuing negotiable debt instruments denominated in United
States currency and payable in New York and by appointing a

268. Despite the Weltover Court's clear statement that the direct effect
clause does not contain a requirement of substantiality or foreseeability, some
lower courts have continued to walk through the substantial and foreseeable test
for want of further guidance on what constitutes a direct effect. See, e.g., Walter
Fuller Aircraft Sales. Inc. v. The Republic of the Phillipines, 965 F.2d 1375. 138687 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying substantial and foreseeable requirements, then
acknowledging that Weltover rejects these requirements and concluding that if
anything, Weltover's more lenient standard strengthens the court's finding that
the defendant's commercial activity had a direct effect in the United States); see
also Maizus v. Weldor Trust Reg., 820 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("[Clourts have consistently held that the FSIA's enumerated exceptions to
sovereign immunity 'requir[e] some form of substantial contact with the United
States.'") (citations omitted).
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (1992).
269.
270. 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
See Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2169 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
271.
383 U.S. 301. 323-24 (1966)).
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X

financial agent in New York, Argentina purposely availed itself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the United States."2 72
The Court's cursory treatment of personal Jurisdiction leaves
open the question of whether a full "fair play and substantial
justice" analysis, the traditional due process test, is required
before a United States court can exercise Jurisdiction over a
foreign state, or whether, as the FSIA seems to suggest, the direct
effect clause embodies any applicable constitutional requirement
of due process. 273 Much like before Weltover, courts that have
faced this dilemma have continued to use a variety of approaches
to determine whether they have jurisdiction over a foreign
2 74
state.
When plaintiffs have asserted that a foreign state is not protected by immunity under the direct effect clause of the
commercial activity exception, several courts have used a
complete fair play and substantial Justice test to determine
whether they have personal jurisdiction over the foreign state.
The Eleventh Circuit case Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc. 2 75
illustrates this approach. In Vermeulen, the court began by

stating that subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state exists
under the FSIA if one of the statutory exceptions to immunity
applies.2 7 8 The Vermeulen court next addressed the issue of
whether the direct effect provision of the commercial activity exception was satisfied in the case before it.
After analyzing the facts, the court concluded that defendant
Renault's acts easily satisfied the Weltover definition of
commercial. 2 7 Noting that the Supreme Court did not decide
whether the direct effect clause incorporates the minimum
contacts test,2 78 the Vermeulen court proceeded to intertwine the
direct effect requirement of the FSIA with a personal Jurisdiction 2 79 minimum contacts analysis. The court set forth three

criteria necessary to constitute minimum contacts:

First, the

272. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
273. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988); see also supra note 96 (setting forth
legislative history of Section 1330(b)).
274. See notes 91-108 and accompanying text (discussing various
approaches to personal Jurisdiction used by courts prior to Weltover).
275. 985 F.2d 1534 (1lth Cir. 1993).

276.

Id.

277.

Id. at 1544.

278.

Id. at 1545.

279.

See Id. at 1548 (labeling its analysis a personal jurisdiction analysis).
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contacts must be related to the cause of action; 280 second, the
contacts must involve an act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting business in the United
States, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the
forum's laws; 2 s 1 and third, the contacts must be such that the
defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into court in the
The court used these three criteria to determine
forum. 2 s 2
commercial activities had a direct effect in the
Renault's
whether
28
United States. 3
After determining that Renault had sufficient contacts with
the forum to satisfy the minimum contacts test, the Vermeulen
court decided that even if a foreign state has the requisite
minimum contacts with a forum, exercise of personal jurisdiction
still violates due process unless it comports with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. 2 8 The court went on
to state that courts must consider "the burden on the defendant,
and the plaintiffs interest in
the interest] of the forum ....
obtaining relief' in determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction
is fair and reasonable. 2 85
In Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of
ReceiversforAW. Galadarl,28 6 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York took a slightly different approach to personal jurisdiction. In contrast to the Vermeulen
approach, which blended both a minimum contacts and a fair
play and substantial justice analysis with the issue of direct ef-

fect, the Drexel Court treated personal jurisdiction as a distinct

analysis, separate from the direct effect analysis. 2 s 7
First, under the rubric of subject matter Jurisdiction, 28 8 the
district court considered whether the defendant's commercial

280. Id. at 1546 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
(1985) and Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990)).
281. Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1546 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958) and Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75).
282. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1551.
285. Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480
U.S. 102, 113 (1987)).
286. Drexel VII, 810 F. Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other grounds,

Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for A.W.
Galadari, 12 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1993).
287. Drexel VII, 810 F. Supp. at 1388.

288.

See Id. at 1378.

712

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:673

activity had a direct effect in the United States. 28 9 After concluding that it did,2 90 the court went on to address personal juris-

diction. The Drexel court stated that personal jurisdiction under
the FSIA is both statutorily defined and governed by
constitutional due process requirements. 29 1 The court found the
statutory requirement for personal jurisdiction, Section 1330(b) of
the Act, satisfied in the case at hand because subject matter
jurisdiction existed-the defendant's activities fell within the

direct effect clause of the Act's commercial activity exception-and
the defendant had been properly served with process. 2 92

Then,

the court proceeded to determine whether sufficient minimum
contacts existed between the foreign state and the forum so that
maintaining the suit comported with traditional notions of fair
293
play and substantial justice.
In sharp contrast to both Drexel and Vermeulen, other courts
have declined to utilize a minimum contacts/fair play and substantial justice standard in the analysis of personal jurisdiction
under the direct effect clause of the FSIA. 2 94 For example, in
Federal Insurance Co. v. Rubln,2 9 5 the District Court for the

289. Id. at 1385-88.
290. Id. at 1387-88.
291. Id. at 1388.
292. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (setting forth Section
1330 of the Act and explaining the statutory requirements of subject matter and
personal jurisdiction).
293.
Drexel VII. 810 F. Supp. at 1389 (citing Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia,
930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)))).
294. Although the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, like the Drexel and Vermeulen courts, has applied a minimum contacts
test when analyzing personal jurisdiction under the direct effect clause of the
commercial activity exception to foreign state immunity, see, e.g., Maizus v.
Weldor Trust Reg., 820 F. Supp. 101, 105 & n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); DJordJevich v.
Bundesminister der Finanzen, 827 F. Supp. 814, 818 (D.D.C. 1993), other courts
have not In Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 979
(S.D. Fla. 1992), the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida listed the facts alleged in plaintiffs complaint and concluded that the
"
defendant's contacts with the United States far exceed the slight contacts that
supported personal jurisdiction in Weltover." The court did not go through a
minimum contacts or fair play and substantial justice analysis. Id. See also
Dibrell Bros. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Rafidain Bank, No. 93-0993, 1994 U.S. Dist,
LEXIS 8271 (D.D.C. June 15, 1994) (stating that the FSIA provides that personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction both exist in a case in which the
foreign state is exempt from immunity and proper service has been made).
295.
No. 92-4177, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 784 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993): rev'd
on other grounds, 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cr. 1993).
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania based its finding of personal
jurisdiction exclusively on Section 1330(b) of the FSIA. The
Federal Insurance court did not analyze constitutional issues
separately, Implicitly concluding that foreign states are not
entitled to due process protection 2 96 or that constitutional protections are already built into the direct effect clause of the FSIA
commercial activity exception.
Despite the dramatically different ways in which lower courts
have analyzed personal jurisdiction, neither the Vermeulen/Drexel
nor the Federal Insurance approach to personal jurisdiction is
foreclosed or mandated by Weltover. The Supreme Court in
Weltover refused to determine whether a foreign state is entitled
to due process protection. Although the Court hinted that a
foreign state is not entitled to due process protection, the Court
applied an abbreviated purposeful availment analysis, which is
part of a traditional minimum contacts test. In light of the

Supreme Court's confusing discussion, conflicting approaches to
personal jurisdiction in the lower courts should be expected. The
Weltover Court declined to decide a constitutional issue of great
The import of the personal
significance to foreign states.
jurisdiction analysis is twofold: lack of personal jurisdiction will
result in the dismissal of the case, 2 97 and absence of basic due
process protections may require foreign states to defend an
increasing number of suits in United States courts.

V. CONCLUSION

Foreign sovereign immunity is universally accepted by states
The concept of foreign
in the international community. 2 98
sovereign immunity reflects the widely recognized principle of
international law that one sovereign has limited freedom to

296. Weltover hints that foreign states might not even be entitled to
constitutional protections. See supra text accompanying notes 269-72.
297. See, e.g., Concord Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y
Seguro, No. 94-2218, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7532 (S.D.N.Y. June 7. 1994). In
Concord Reinsurance, the court dismissed the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction. In response to the plaintiffs argument that personal jurisdiction
automatically exists if subject matter jurisdiction exists and proper service of

process has been made, the court stated that "more recent law makes it clear that
personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant also must be supported
by constitutionally required minimum contacts." Id.
298. Donoghue, supra note 18, at 518 & n.155.
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exercise its adjudicatory power over another. 29 9 A state which
casually exercises jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign may be in
breach of international law. To avoid this undesirable possibility,
United States courts must not have unfettered discretion to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign states.
Despite the apparent flaws of Weltover's private person
commercial activity test and direct effect test, the Supreme Court
has mandated that lower courts use these tests when faced with a
direct effect commercial activity exception case. However, by
broadly framing the definition of both commercial activity and
direct effect, these tests give lower courts almost free reign to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign states. Therefore, to avoid offending norms of international law, courts must turn to the Issue

of personal jurisdiction, the only major issue the Court left undecided.
In Weltover, the Court refused to determine whether the
direct effect clause of the FSIA incorporates due process
requirements or whether a separate minimum contacts analysis is
necessary. 3 0° Several important considerations suggest that a
United States court should conduct a separate due process
analysis. First, as one commentator has asserted, because a
direct effect analysis relates to subject matter jurisdiction and a
minimum contacts analysis relates to personal jurisdiction, the
30 1
two analyses are separate and may lead to different results.
For example, the activities at issue may not have caused a sufficient direct effect in the United States to warrant the exercise of
jurisdiction under the FSIA, but a court may still be able to assert
jurisdiction over the foreign state using the doctrine of general
jurisdiction.3 0 2 Conversely, a foreign state's commercial acts may
have produced a direct effect in the United States, but the foreign
state may not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum,
under a traditional due process analysis, to justify an exercise of
jurisdiction.3 0 3 Therefore, because a subject matter jurisdiction
analysis tests a different type of contact with a forum than does a

299.
300.

Id. at 518 & n.156.
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (1992);

see also text accompanying notes 91-108 (explaining the two approaches taken by
lower courts prior to the Weltover decision).
301. Card, supra note 85, at 97.

302.
303.

Id. at 97 &n.39.
Id. at 97 &n.40.
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personal jurisdiction analysis, a separate due process analysis is
necessary to avoid unfairness 3 04 to the foreign state.
Second, a minimum contacts analysis may be necessary to
effectuate Congress' intent. Indeed, Section 1330(b) of the FSIA
provides that personal jurisdiction exists when an exception to
immunity applies and proper service of process has been made.3 0 5
Moreover, in the legislative history of the Act, Congress stated
that the minimum contacts requirement is embodied in the
exceptions to immunity.3 0 6 Together, the language and legislative
history of the Act arguably may imply that a separate due process
analysis under the direct effect clause is unnecessary. However,
Congress wrote, "[s]ignificantly, each of the immunity provisions.
. requires some connection between the law suit and the United
States ....- 3 o 7 The Weltover Court held that an effect does not
have to be substantial or foreseeable to be direct,3 08 in essence
deleting Congress' reference to Section 18 of the Restatement
3 9
(Second) in the legislative history of direct effect clause. G
Arguably, this exception to immunity no longer requires a
sufficient nexus with the United States to conform with Congress'
intent. Therefore, to give effect to Congress' intent, courts should

determine whether the foreign state has sufficient3 10minimum

contacts with the forum before adjudicating the claim.
Third, due process protections for foreign states will help
ensure that United States courts' dockets do not become overcrowded with lawsuits involving activities that occurred outside
the United States. Thousands of cases have been brought under

304. A foreign state has a legitimate right to manage its own affairs.
DELLAPENNA, supra note 179, at 163. This interest of the foreign state suggests
that due process protections are necessary to ensure that it is fair for a United
States court to adjudicate a claim against a foreign state or a foreign state-owned
entity.
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1988).
306. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6612.
307. Id.
308. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2168 (1992).
309. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6618.
310. It is important to note that Congress does not have the authority to
determine when constitutional standards apply and whether a statute comports
with constitutional requirements. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803). These matters are uniquely the province of the courts. Regardless of
Congress' position on the issue, foreign states engaging in a commercial activity
may In fact be entitled to due process protection.
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the FSIA since it was enacted in 1976.311 Significantly, the direct
effect clause of the commercial activity exception has been
litigated more than any other provision of the Act.3 12 Requiring
that foreign states have sufficient minimum contacts with the
United States before adjudicating a claim against a foreign state
will serve the pragmatic purpose of eliminating
suits that are only
313
marginally connected to the United States.
Fourth, due process protections for foreign states will help
ensure that a judicial determination of jurisdiction does not
embarrass the executive branch. Indeed, the judicial branch was
traditionally hesitant to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states
because this area was almost exclusively the province of the
executive branch. 3 14 If a foreign state has minimum contacts
with the United States, it is less likely that adjudication by a
United States court will conflict with the executive department's
conduct of foreign affairs. On the other hand, adjudicating a
claim against a foreign state merely because the state's
commercial acts had a direct effect in the United States may
offend the foreign state.
Fifth, United States courts should conduct a due process
analysis before exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state because
a foreign state that engages in commercial activities is functioning
like a private corporation. The Weltover Court gave one clue on
the issue of whether a foreign state is entitled to due process
protection. In a parenthetical citation, the Court referred to an
earlier decision which held that states of the United States are not
persons entitled to due process protection. 31 5 With this citation,
the Court seemed to imply that foreign states are not entitled to
due process protection either. If the Court sought to make an
analogy between states of the United States and foreign states
engaging in commercial activities, the Court's analogy is faulty.

In a direct effect clause analysis, the commercial acts of a foreign
state or a state-owned entity are at issue. When a foreign state

311.
DELLAPENNA, supra note 179, at vi (stating that over 2,000 cases were
brought under the Act in the first ten years after the FSIA was enacted).
312. See Ld.at 90.
313. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that n enacting the FSIA,
Congress was concerned that United States courts would become international
courts of claims in which anyone could litigate any dispute against a foreign state.
See Verlinden S.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
314. DELLAPENNA, supra note 179, at 82.
315. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (1992)
(citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966)).
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acts in a commercial capacity, rather than in a public, sovereign
capacity, the foreign state is functioning more like a private
corporation than a state of the Union. Corporations have long
been entitled to due process protection. 3 16 Therefore, a foreign
state functioning effectively like a corporation should be afforded
due process protection as well.
Finally, and most importantly, foreign states should be given:
due process protections to satisfy the international law principal
which requires that jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign must be
reasonable. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
provides that a state may exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate over a
person or thing if the jurisdiction is reasonable. 3 17 Indeed, the
minimum contacts analysis was developed to ensure that the
exercise of jurisdiction over absent defendants would be reasonable. A minimum contacts analysis would best effectuate the
Restatement (Third) goal of reasonableness, with the added
advantage of offering courts a familiar framework to use. More
importantly, a minimum contacts test would comply with
universal principles of international law by limiting the power of
United States courts to adjudicate claims against a foreign state.
To conclude, a number of reasons suggest that a foreign state

is entitled to due process protection.

Because the Weltover

decision eviscerates other safeguards which could have prevented
United States courts from unreasonably exercising jurisdiction
over a foreign state, United States courts should use a minimum
contacts analysis to ensure that the interests of the foreign state
are considered. United States courts would be wise to take this
cautious approach to jurisdiction over foreign states to avoid the
unwelcome potential result of placing the United States in breach
of international law.
Sarah K Schano

316. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (due
process requires that an absent corporate defendant must have certain minimum
contacts to be subject to a judgment).
317.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 421 (1986).

